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RESTRUCTURING OF INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS IN CANADA 
 
JGA Krüger* 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper gives a very general outline of the formal restructuring of insolvent 
corporations in Canada. For a South African audience, it is important to understand 
that in Canada a distinction is made between an "insolvent person" and a "bankrupt". 
A "bankrupt" means a person who has made an assignment into bankruptcy 
(voluntarily), or against whom a bankruptcy order has been made. An "insolvent 
person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business 
or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors amount to $1 000, and who 
is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due, or 
who has ceased to pay his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as 
they generally become due, or the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair 
valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process 
would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing 
due. An "insolvent person" in Canada may avoid bankruptcy by resorting to 
restructuring processes created by statute. The fact that a person becomes insolvent 
does not necessarily spell bankruptcy. Canadians are fortunate to have access to 
bankruptcy courts and insolvency practitioners with a high level of commercial and 
legal skills to assist them in restructuring their financial affairs and avoiding 
bankruptcy. 
 
After practising as an advocate in Johannesburg for about fifteen years, I emigrated 
to Canada. At the Johannesburg bar, I had a busy insolvency and commercial 
litigation practise. After I re-qualified in Canada to practise there as a barrister and 
solicitor, I continued to practise in the areas of insolvency and commercial litigation. 
One of the highlights of practising insolvency in Canada for me is the sophisticated 
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restructuring legislation in that country that assists insolvent persons to avoid 
bankruptcy. When I left South Africa in 1998, I often regretted the needless 
bankruptcies of significant corporations that could have been rescued had there 
been a proper legislative framework for restructuring insolvent debtors. 
 
In this paper, I will give an overview of the formal restructuring of insolvent 
corporations in Canada. I have been away from South Africa for too long to make 
any responsible comments on the present legislation in South Africa applicable to 
insolvent corporations, and will therefore not embark on a comparative study. 
 
The emergence of Canadian restructuring law1 
 
Both the Insolvent Act of 1869 and the Insolvent Act of 1875, in common with 
English bankruptcy legislation of the Victoria era, permitted a debtor to enter into a 
deed of composition with creditors. The deed would become binding on all creditors 
if it was approved by the majority of creditors holding three-quarters of the value of 
debts. 
 
After the repeal of federal insolvency legislation in 1880 due to fraud and abuse by 
debtors, the provincial law governed any arrangements between debtors and 
creditors until the enactments of the Bankruptcy Act of 1919. The statutory scheme 
reintroduced by the Bankruptcy Act of 1919 permitted an insolvent debtor to make a 
proposal for a composition, extension, or scheme of arrangement. However, 
concerns over fraudulent proposals led to amendments to Canadian bankruptcy 
legislation in 1923 that allowed a debtor to make a proposal only if the debtor first 
went into bankruptcy. Although the scheme allowed creditors to gain a more 
accurate picture of the financial affairs of the debtor and curtailed opportunities for 
abuse by fraudulent trustees, the stigma of bankruptcy diminished debtors' ability to 
carry on business. This restriction was eliminated in 1949 and the debtors were 
again able to make proposals without having to go into bankruptcy. The fact that 
secured creditors were left unaffected was another critical weakness of the proposal 
                                                 
1  Wood Bankruptcy 309. 
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provisions. The inability to stay the rights of secured creditors severely hampered the 
effectiveness of these provisions in a commercial context. 
 
The Parliament of Canada enacted the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act2 
(CCAA) in 1933 to provide a mechanism through which a company could attempt to 
negotiate an arrangement with its creditors. This was during the Great Depression 
when there was a significant need to protect corporations against aggressive 
creditors. The CCAA further permitted a court to stay enforcement proceedings of 
secured creditors. Amendments to the CCAA in 1953 restricted its application to 
companies that had issued bonds or debentures under a trust indenture. This 
restriction seriously limited the availability of the statute. The CCAA was revived in 
the early 1980s, during an economic recession, where the courts conscious of the 
unavailability of an effective regime for corporate restructuring, recognised "instant 
trust deeds" for the sole purpose of qualifying corporations to restructure under the 
CCAA. The CCAA then rapidly became the primary vehicle through which cooperate 
restructuring was affected.  
 
The proposal provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act3 (BIA) were amended 
in 1992 to permit an insolvent debtor to make a proposal to both secured and 
unsecured creditors with the threshold for acceptance only of a majority of creditors 
holding two-thirds the value of the claims. Although it was anticipated that the 
proposal provisions of the BIA would become the primary means for restructuring 
financially distressed enterprises, the CCAA continued to be employed to restructure 
corporations and primarily large enterprises. This has given rise to the existence of 
dual commercial restructuring regimes, a highly distinctive feature of Canadian 
insolvency law. Therefore, an insolvent debtor will usually need to make an 
assessment of advantages and disadvantages of restructuring under each regime in 
order to maximise the chances of success. 
 
The reform of commercial insolvency law has adopted a deliberate strategy of 
convergence to align the principles under each restructuring regime. Despite this 
attempt, there are still many significant differences between the two, and it remains 
                                                 
2  RSC 1985, c C-36. 
3  RSC 1985, c B-3. 
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necessary for legal advisors to conduct a careful evaluation before making a 
decision to restructure under each regime. 
 
The 2005/2007 insolvency reforms proceeded on the basis that the two general 
commercial restructuring regimes should be kept separate. This was based on the 
view that CCAA is more flexible and better suited to resolving the multitude of issues 
that arise in connection with restructuring of larger businesses. The rule-based 
approach of the BIA was viewed as being more suitable for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, where fewer court applications reduced the cost of restructuring. These 
reforms continued to adhere to the policy of convergence under which differences 
between the two regimes were to be minimised. However, many significant 
differences continue to exist between the two. 
 
The objectives of restructuring law 
 
The purpose of restructuring law is to provide an insolvent debtor with a limited but 
reasonable period of time within which to develop a plan or proposal and present it 
before its creditors, who must decide to accept or reject it. The objectives of 
restructuring can be summarised as rescuing financially distressed firms, maximising 
the values of assets for creditors, and protecting the public interest. 
 
Commencing restructuring proceedings 
 
A decision to initiate a restructuring is of crucial importance. The debtor will usually 
explore a number of alternatives. The debtor must also determine which 
restructuring regime may be be used if both CCAA and BIA are available. The 
commencement of restructuring proceedings is accompanied by a stay of 
proceedings. This gives the debtor a short relief from the enforcement activities of 
creditors and the opportunity to develop a plan of compromise to put before its 
creditors for approval. If the creditors convince the court that the liquidation of the 
debtor is the preferred option and the restructuring attempt should be terminated, the 
debtor will likely be liquidated through bankruptcy or receivership proceedings.4 
                                                 
4  Wood Bankruptcy1 326. 
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Eligible persons 
 
It is necessary to determine whether the debtor meets the statutory eligibility 
requirements imposed by the insolvency regimes before commencing restructuring 
proceedings. Both regimes require that the debtor be bankrupt or insolvent.5 
 
Eligibility under the CCAA 
 
The CCAA has stricter statutory eligibility requirements than the BIA. In order to 
qualify, the debtor must be a "debtor company" and the total claims against it and 
any affiliated debtor company must exceed C$5 million.6 The CCAA defines "debtor 
company" as a company that is bankrupt or insolvent.7 The definition of "company" 
covers federal and provincial corporations, as well as any foreign corporation having 
assets and doing business in Canada.8 The CCAA therefore adopts an eligibility 
criterion that depends upon the legal structure of the business entity.9  
 
The C$5 million threshold limits the availability of the CCAA to larger companies; 
however, claims against all affiliated companies are combined.10 "Claims" are 
defined as any indebtedness, liability, or obligation that would be provable in 
bankruptcy.11 This permits the inclusion of unliquidated or contingent claims into the 
determination. 
 
Eligibility under the BIA 
 
The commercial proposal provisions in the BIA adopt less restrictive eligibility 
conditions. The provisions of the BIA are not limited to corporations but apply to 
persons generally, and individuals and non-corporate business entities can 
                                                 
5  BIA S 2. 
6  CCAA S 3(1). 
7  CCAA S 2(1). 
8  Global Light Telecommunications Inc 2004, 2 CBR (5th) 210 (BCSC). 
9  Wood Bankruptcy 327. 
10  Wood Bankruptcy 328. 
11  CCAA S 2(1). 
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restructure under this regime.12 The BIA does not impose a financial threshold based 
on the value of outstanding claims against the debtor.  
 
Commencing proceedings under the CCAA 
 
Restructuring proceedings under the CCAA are commenced through an application 
to a court for an initial order.13 Although the statute does not require that the debtor 
company bring the application, it is nearly always the case that the debtor company 
will initiate the proceedings.14 An application for an initial order under the CCAA can 
be made on an ex parte basis where there is a chance that creditors will attempt to 
exercise their enforcement remedies against the debtor's assets before the court 
hears the matter.15 The initial application is usually made only with notice to the 
major creditors.16 The initial application will usually request an order that authorises 
the debtor company to continue its business operations and stay in possession of its 
property, stays proceedings against the debtor company, appoints a monitor, 
authorises the debtor company to obtain interim financing,17 authorises the debtor 
company to file a plan of arrangement, and permits interested parties to apply to the 
court for variation or amendment of the order (a "comeback" clause).18 
 
The stay of proceedings provided for in the initial order cannot exceed thirty days. A 
subsequent application will be required to extend stay of proceedings.19 This allows 
parties affected by the initial order to have an opportunity to express their views 
concerning the eligibility of the debtor or the appropriateness of the order.20 
 
A monitor is an independent third party (a qualified bankruptcy trustee) who monitors 
the company's ongoing operations and assists with the filing and voting on the plan 
                                                 
12  BIA S 50(1). 
13  CCAA S 11.02(1). 
14  Wood Bankruptcy 330. 
15  Wood Bankruptcy 330. 
16  Royal Oak Mines Inc 1999, 6 CBR (4th) 314 (Ont Ct Gen Div) – hereafter Royal Oak. 
17  Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. 
18  Wood Bankruptcy 330–331. 
19  CCAA S 11.02(2). 
20  Wood Bankruptcy 331. 
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of arrangement. The monitor must notify the every known creditor that has a claim of 
more than C$1 000 against the company and advise it of the order.21 
 
Commencing proceedings under the BIA 
 
Restructuring proceedings under the BIA can be initiated through two routes, neither 
of which requires intervention of a court in order to commence the proceedings. The 
first route is taken in instances in which the debtor has already developed a 
commercial proposal; however, most business organisations are unable to file a 
proposal in the first instance where they need time to negotiate its terms with their 
creditors. Accordingly, most commercial entities that restructure under the BIA take 
the second route. This allows the debtor to initiate proceedings by filing a notice of 
intention to make a proposal with the official receiver.22 The trustee is required to 
notify every known creditor of the notice of intention within five days of its filing.23 
 
Switching restructuring regimes 
 
Both the CCAA and the BIA contain provisions that prevent a debtor from invoking 
the other restructuring regime if the plan or proposal has failed under the regime 
initially chosen. However, mid-stream jumps between the two regimes are 
permissible.24 The BIA provides that proceedings commenced under the CCAA shall 
not be dealt with or continued under the BIA.25 Therefore, the BIA proceeding must 
be commenced afresh through the filing of a notice of intention or a proposal.26 The 
CCAA provides that restructuring proceedings under the BIA may be continued 
under the CCAA.27 This means that the CCAA initiation proceedings do not need to 
be commenced afresh and the initial and subsequent applications procedure is not 
invoked.28 
 
                                                 
21  CCAA S 23(1)(a). 
22  CCAA S 50.4 (1). 
23  CCAA S 50.4 (6). 
24  Royal Oak; Mega Bleu Inc/Mega Blue Inc 2003, 30 CBR (4th) 80 (NBQB). 
25  BIA S 66(2)(a). 
26  Wood Bankruptcy 332. 
27  CCAA S 11.6(a). 
28  Wood Bankruptcy 332. 
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Stay of proceedings 
 
A major difference between the stay of proceedings under the CCAA and BIA is that 
the former is derived from a court order and the latter automatically upon the 
commencement of proceedings. Therefore, a court in CCAA proceedings is able to 
tailor the stay of proceeding to address specific problems associated with the 
particular business.29 The power given to a court to stay proceedings under the 
CCAA has been interpreted broadly. The 2005/2007 amendments to the CCAA now 
provide a separate statutory basis for the exercise of many of these powers. Both 
acts provide that the Crown is bound.30 
 
Stay of proceedings under the CCAA 
 
Stay of proceedings that is typically granted by a court in CCAA has a broad scope. 
It prevents any commencement or continuation of proceedings before a court or a 
tribunal.31 This includes judicial, extrajudicial, and self-help remedies and is effective 
against secured and unsecured creditors.32 The stay does not affect prosecution of 
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings against the debtor.33 However, it applies to 
enforcement proceedings that are brought to recover a fine or penalty.34 
In seeking an initial order staying proceedings as well as any subsequent orders, the 
applicant must satisfy the court that circumstances exist that make such an order 
appropriate.35 In obtaining a subsequent order, the applicant must also satisfy the 
court that the applicant is acting in good faith and with due diligence.36  
 
Stay of proceedings under the BIA 
 
The stay of proceedings under the BIA arises automatically upon the filing of a 
proposal with a trustee or upon filing of a notice of intention with the official 
                                                 
29  Wood Bankruptcy 333. 
30  CCAA S 40. 
31  Luscar Ltd v Smoky River Coal Ltd 1999, 12 CBR (4th) 94 (Alta CA). 
32  Quintette Coal Ltd v Nippon Steel Corp 1990, 2 CBR (3d) 303 (BCCA). 
33  Milner Greenhouses Ltd v Saskatchewan 2004, 50 CBR (4th) 214 (Sask QB). 
34  Air Canada 2006, 28 CBR (5th) 317 (Ont SCJ). 
35  Wood Bankruptcy 334. 
36  CCAA S 11.02(3). 
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receiver.37 Unlike the stay of proceedings under ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, a 
stay under BIA restructuring proceedings binds both secured and unsecured 
creditors.38 When restructuring proceedings are initiated under the BIA through a 
notice of intention, the automatic stay of proceedings ends upon the filing of 
proposal.39 Upon filing of the proposal, a second stay of proceedings automatically 
comes into operation and ends when the trustee is discharged or the debtor has 
become bankrupt.40 
 
Lifting the stay of proceedings 
 
Creditors might bring a motion to lift a stay of proceedings in an attempt to terminate 
the restructuring and replace it with some other insolvency regime, such as 
bankruptcy or receivership.  
 
Where a restructuring is attempted under the CCAA, a creditor can bring an 
application to lift a stay pursuant to the comeback provision that is typically found in 
the initial order or subsequent orders.41 This provision gives an interested person the 
right to apply to the court to vary or amend the order. The motion can also be 
brought before the court when the debtor company makes a subsequent application 
to obtain an extension of the stay beyond the period granted by the initial order.42  
 
Where a restructuring is attempted under the BIA, a creditor may apply to a court for 
a declaration that the stay of proceedings no longer applies to that creditor.43 The 
court may make the declaration if it is satisfied that the creditor is likely to be 
materially prejudiced and it is equitable on other grounds to do so.44 
 
Although the CCAA does not articulate the grounds for lifting the stay, the courts 
apply a similar approach to BIA in deciding if a stay of proceedings should be 
                                                 
37  BIA S 69.1(1) and 69(1). 
38  Wood Bankruptcy 334. 
39  BIA S 69(1). 
40  BIA S 69.1(1)(a). 
41  Wood Bankruptcy 343. 
42  Wood Bankruptcy 343. 
43  BIA S 69.4. 
44  Wood Bankruptcy 343. 
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amended or varied in relation to a particular creditor.45 Therefore, court will lift the 
stay where it is satisfied that the creditor is likely to be materially prejudiced and that 
it is equitable on other grounds. Typically, creditors will seek to convince the court 
that the application is "doomed to fail". 
 
Terminating restructuring proceedings 
 
Both the CCAA and the BIA allow creditors to apply for termination of restructuring 
proceedings. Under the CCAA, a general lifting of the stay terminates restructuring 
proceedings and all of the creditors are entitled to exercise their ordinary remedies 
against the debtor. This will usually result in the liquidation of the debtor through 
bankruptcy or receivership. However, these proceedings do not arise automatically 
and must be initiated by the creditors following the termination.46 In contrast, a failure 
of the restructuring proceedings under the BIA will result in automatic bankruptcy of 
the debtor.47 
 
Termination under the CCAA 
 
There are three methods by which the creditors can bring a request for the 
termination of the restructuring proceedings before a court. The first is to wait until 
the debtor applies to court for renewal of the stay of proceedings. A challenge by 
creditors is most likely to be brought at the hearing of the debtor company's 
subsequent application for a stay immediately following the end of the period 
specified in the initial order.48 There is no limit on the length in time or the number of 
subsequent extensions to the stay of proceedings that can be granted by a court. 
Creditors may also choose to seek termination of restructuring proceedings at one of 
these later extension applications.49 The second method is to bring an application to 
the court pursuant to a comeback clause that is typically included in the court 
order.50 The third method for challenging the stay of proceedings is to appeal the 
                                                 
45  Wood Bankruptcy 343. 
46  Wood Bankruptcy 346. 
47  BIA S 50(12.1), 50.4(8), 57, 61(2) and 63(4). 
48  843504 Alberta Ltd 2003, 4 CBR (5th) 306 (Alta QB). 
49  San Francisco Gifts Ltd 2005, 10 CBR (5th) 275 (Alta QB).  
50  Algoma Steel Inc 2001, 25 CBR (4th) 194 (Ont CA). 
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order. This method is more difficult than the other two because of the high threshold 
that is applied for this process.51 
 
Termination under the BIA 
 
A debtor who files a notice of intention to make a proposal is given a thirty-day 
period within which to make a proposal.52 The debtor may apply to court for an 
extension, but any extension given cannot exceed forty-five days.53 An application 
for an extension of period must be made before the initial or extended time period 
has expired.54 The total length of extensions following the initial thirty-day period 
cannot exceed five months. A failure to make a proposal within six months results in 
an automatic bankruptcy of the debtor.55 Creditors who wish to challenge the 
restructuring proceedings are not required to wait until the debtor makes an 
application for an extension of the period. They may apply to court for an order 
terminating the period, which will result in the automatic bankruptcy of the debtor.56 
 
Grounds for terminating restructuring proceedings 
 
Lack of due diligence of the debtor, bad faith of the debtor, unlikelihood of a viable 
proposal, and material prejudice to the creditors are grounds for terminating 
restructuring proceedings under the BIA.57 The grounds that are set out in CCAA are 
less precise.58 Lack of due diligence and bad faith on the part of the debtor are 
grounds for termination.59 However, the remaining ground is that there are 
circumstances that make the granting of the order appropriate.60 
 
The absence of specific language in the CCAA with regard to the likelihood of a 
viable proposal and material prejudice to creditors does not mean that these are not 
                                                 
51  Wood Bankruptcy 347. 
52  BIA S 50.4(8). 
53  BIA S 50.4(9). 
54  Wood Bankruptcy 347. 
55  Wood Bankruptcy 348. 
56  BIA S 50.4(11). 
57  BIA S 50(12), 50.4(9) and 50.4(11). 
58  Wood Bankruptcy 348. 
59  CCAA S 11.02(3)(b). 
60  CCAA S 11.02(3)(a). 
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important. The court is given some leeway under the CCAA to permit restructuring 
proceedings to continue despite the fact that it may cause prejudice to creditors.61  
 
a) Lack of due diligence 
 
Under the CCAA, there is some tendency to grant the initial order as a matter of 
routine.62 Thereafter, on applications by the debtor for an extension of the period, the 
debtor must demonstrate that it is making reasonable progress in the restructuring 
process. Inability to demonstrate sufficient progress can result in termination of the 
restructuring proceedings.63 
 
b) Lack of good faith 
 
Evidence that the debtor has attempted to mislead the other parties or the court or 
that the debtor is attempting to use the restructuring for an ulterior purpose are 
factors that may cause the court to use this ground to terminate restructuring 
proceedings.64 
 
c) Doomed to failure 
 
A plan must be approved by a majority of creditors who have two-thirds of the value 
of the outstanding claims in order to be accepted.65 Therefore, a creditor or group of 
creditors who have more than one-third of the value of the claims of a particular 
class have a veto and are able to defeat the plan.66 There is no point in incurring the 
expenses of restructuring proceeding if there is no reasonable prospect that the 
attempt will succeed. The lack of support of the key creditors together with other 
evidence, such as inadequate financing or loss of faith in management, may cause a 
                                                 
61  Wood Bankruptcy 349; Skydome Corp v Ontario 1998, 16 CBR (4th) 125 para 11 (Ont Ct Gen 
Div). 
62  Wood Bankruptcy 349. 
63  Timber Lodge Ltd v Imperial Life Assurance Co 1992, 17 CBR (3d) 126. 
64  Wood Bankruptcy 349. 
65  CCAA S 6(1); BIA S 54(2) and 62(2)(b). 
66  Wood Bankruptcy 350. 
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court to terminate the proceedings on the ground that it has no reasonable chance of 
success.67 
 
d) Material prejudice 
 
A fully secured creditor must wait until the plan is developed and put before the 
creditors before it can realise against the collateral, but this on its own is not 
considered material prejudice that would justify a termination of the restructuring 
proceedings.68 There must be material prejudice, such as where proceedings are 
resulting in a loss of value of the underlying assets so that the creditors will receive 
less than they would were the assets to be liquidated immediately. 
 
Operating the business 
 
Interim financing 
 
The term "DIP financing" is used to describe the interim financing required for the 
ongoing operations of the business during restructuring proceedings. Neither the 
CCAA nor the BIA originally addressed the issue of DIP financing, and the gap was 
filled by the courts by exercising their inherent or equitable jurisdiction.69 The 
2005/2007 amendments specifically address interim financing in both the CCAA and 
BIA restructurings. A court is empowered to make an order declaring that all or part 
of the debtor's property is subject to a security or charge in an amount that the court 
considers appropriate.70 
 
The statue directs courts to consider the following factors in deciding whether to 
make such an order71: 
  
(a) the period during which the debtor is expected to be subject to restructuring 
proceedings; 
                                                 
67  Cumberland Trading Inc 1994, 23 CBR (3d) 225 (Ont Ct Gen Div). 
68  H & H Fisheries Ltd 2005, 18 CBR (5th) 293 (NSSC). 
69  Wood Bankruptcy 356–357. 
70  CCAA S 11.2(1); BIA S 50.6(1). 
71  CCAA S 11.2(4); BIA S 50.6(5). 
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(b) the manner in which the debtor's business and financial affairs are to be 
managed during the proceedings; 
(c) whether the major creditors have confidence in the debtor's management; 
(d) whether the loan will enhance the prospects of a viable plan or proposal being 
made in respect of the debtor; 
(e) the nature and value of the debtor's property; 
(f) whether any creditor will be materially prejudiced as a result of a security or 
charge; and the report of the monitor or the trustee as to the reasonableness of 
the debtor's cash-flow statement. 
 
Governance and supervision 
 
The debtor does not usually lose control over the management of its business during 
the period in which restructuring proceedings are ongoing. The initiation of 
restructuring proceedings radically changes the environment within which the debtor 
manages and operates its business. The debtor must work closely with the monitor, 
insolvency professionals and expert legal advisors and must engage in a series of 
negotiations with claimants in order to develop an acceptable plan.72 
 
The role of the debtor 
 
Where a debtor is a closely held corporation, a single person or a small group of 
persons hold a controlling interest in the corporation. These individuals sometimes 
possess firm-specific knowledge and expertise, which makes it necessary to retain 
them as participants in the restructured business.73 Where the shares of the 
corporation are traded publicly however there is a division between ownership and 
control. It is often the case that the total value of the creditor's claims exceeds the 
going-concern value of the financially distressed firm. In such a case, the 
shareholder's interest will usually be wiped out and they will not be participants in the 
restructured corporation.74 Therefore, during the restructuring proceedings, the 
corporate directors must recognise that it is no longer appropriate for them to focus 
                                                 
72  Wood Bankruptcy 382. 
73  Wood Bankruptcy 383. 
74  Stelco Inc 2006, 17 CBR (5th) 78 (Ont SCJ). 
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upon the interests of shareholders when making their decisions.75 It may be also 
necessary to change the current management team where the creditors have lost 
trust in the management of directors.76 
 
The role of the monitor and the trustee 
 
A monitor under CCAA and a trustee under BIA have a similar but not an identical 
role. They are officers of the court with the primary obligation to ensure that accurate 
and timely information is provided to the creditors and to the court.77 A monitor or a 
trustee has to be a qualified person under the CCAA and the BIA.78 
 
Originally, the CCAA did not provide for the appointment of a monitor and therefore a 
court appointed one by exercising its inherent or equitable jurisdiction.79 In 1997, the 
appointment of a monitor was made a mandatory feature of a CCAA restructuring. 
The primary obligation of the monitor is to monitor the business and financial affairs 
of the company.80 A monitor is given a right of access to and examination of the 
debtor's property for the purpose of monitoring the debtor's business and financial 
affairs.81 Specific statutory duties of monitors are set out in CCAA.82 
 
A trustee is under a statutory obligation to make an appraisal and investigation of the 
affairs and property of the debtor in order to estimate with reasonable accuracy the 
financial situation of the debtor and the cause of the debtor's financial difficulties or 
insolvency and report the result to the creditors.83 Specific statutory duties of trustees 
are set out in BIA.84 
 
The monitor and the trustee are given a right of access to and examination of the 
debtor's property for the purpose of monitoring the debtor's business and financial 
                                                 
75  Peoples Department Store Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461. 
76  CCAA S 11.5(1); BIA S 64(1). 
77  Wood Bankruptcy 388. 
78  CCAA S 11.7(1); BIA S 2. 
79  Wood Bankruptcy 389. 
80  CCAA S 11.7(1). 
81  CCAA S 24. 
82  CCAA S 23(1). 
83  BIA S 50(5). 
84  BIA S 50,50.4,50.5 and 58. 
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affairs.85 They must also act honestly and in good faith and must comply with the 
code of ethics that governs the conduct of trustees.86 
 
Usually the debtor selects the person to act as a monitor or a trustee. However, once 
that person has been appointed, he/she becomes an officer of the court and only the 
court has the power to terminate his/her appointment.87 The CCAA expressly gives 
the court the power to direct a monitor to carry out other functions.88 The initial order 
will usually give the monitor the power to advise the debtor company in the 
development of its plan and in respect of its meeting with its creditors.89 Under the 
BIA, the trustee is expressly given the power to advise the debtor and participate in 
the preparation of the proposal, including negotiations with the creditors.90 
 
Monitors and trustees are given statutory protection from liability. A monitor is not 
liable for loss caused by a party who relies on a monitor's report if the monitor acts in 
good faith and takes reasonable care in its preparation.91 A trustee is not liable for 
loss caused to any party from that party's reliance on the cash-flow statements if the 
trustee acts in good faith and takes reasonable care on reviewing those 
statements.92 Monitors and trustees are further protected from personal liability and 
liability arising from environmental conditions that occurred before their appointment, 
or if the damage was not caused by their wilful conduct or gross negligence after 
their appointment.93 
 
The role of the courts 
 
The traditional view of the difference between the CCAA and BIA restructuring 
proceedings is that CCAA has a higher degree of court involvement and of judicial 
discretion than the BIA. The BIA is characterised as being more rule driven and 
                                                 
85  CCAA S 24; BIA S 50(10) and 50.4(7)(a). 
86  CCAA S 25. 
87  CCAA S 11.7(3). 
88  CCAA S 23(1)(k). 
89  Wood Bankruptcy 393. 
90  Wood Bankruptcy 393. 
91  CCAA S 23(2). 
92  BIA S. 50(9) and 50.4(5). 
93  CCAA S 11.8 (1) and (3); BIA S 14.06(1.2) and (2). 
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therefore less adaptable to larger and more complex restructuring proceedings.94 
However, this conventional view needs to be modified in light of current legislative 
amendments to both regimes.95 The amendments to the commercial proposal 
provisions of the BIA have given the courts the same powers as those available 
under the CCAA. These powers include the power to authorise DIP financing, 
authorise the creation of directors' and officers' charge ranking in priority over 
secured creditors, authorise the creation of an administrative charge ranking in 
priority over secured creditors, review the disclaimer of contracts by the debtor, 
authorise the assignment of contracts, authorise the sale of assets outside the 
ordinary course of business of the debtor, and the power to impose a stay of 
proceedings in respect of regulatory proceedings.96 
 
The role of the creditors 
 
Creditors can strongly influence the direction of the restructuring through bargaining, 
the use of actual or threatened litigation, and voting on the plan.97 Creditors may 
bring application to terminate the restructuring proceedings or to lift the stay of 
proceedings. In appropriate cases, the courts will approve the formation of a 
creditors' committee, and its fees will be paid as part of the restructuring costs. 
 
Developing and approving the plan 
 
The aim in a commercial restructuring is to come up with an agreement that will be 
approved by the creditors. The agreement is termed a "plan of compromise" or "plan 
of arrangement" in CCAA proceedings and a "commercial proposal" under the BIA 
(both are referred to as the "plan" in this paper). The plan usually separates the 
creditors into a number of different classes and it is not binding on any class of 
creditors, unless it is approved by them. It is sufficient that a majority of creditors who 
hold at least two-thirds the value of the claims vote in favour of it. A court must then 
review the plan to ensure that it is not unfair. If the court approves it, the plan 
becomes binding on all the creditors affected by its terms. 
                                                 
94  Wood Bankruptcy 394. 
95  Wood Bankruptcy 394. 
96  BIA S 50.6, 64.1, 64.2, 65.11(3)-(4), 84.1, 65.13 and 69.6. 
97  Wood Bankruptcy 399. 
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Developing the plan 
 
A debtor who enters into restructuring proceedings must usually attempt to maintain 
business operations in an environment in which extensive negotiations with lenders 
may be required, worried suppliers must be reassured, and steps for preservation 
and operation of the business must be taken. Moreover, the debtor must attempt to 
negotiate and develop an acceptable plan to all the relevant stakeholders.98 
Therefore, a debtor is faced with a challenge of negotiating a deal under severe time 
constraints and pressure. The process is made more difficult by the fact that the 
creditors do not always speak in harmony and are often in conflict with one 
another.99  
 
Mandatory features of the plan 
 
Both restructuring regimes include a number of mandatory features that must be 
included in a plan in order to be accepted. Firstly, the plan must provide for the 
payment in full to Her Majesty within six months after court approval of all the 
amounts in respect of unremitted source deductions of income tax, Canada Pension 
Plan deductions, and Employment Insurance.100 Secondly, the plan must provide for 
payment to the employees of no less than the amount that the employees would be 
qualified to claim as a preferred creditor in the event of a bankruptcy together with all 
amounts earned after the commencement of restructuring proceedings.101 Thirdly, 
the plan must provide for the payment of unremitted pension contributions.102 
 
Approval by the creditors 
 
Restructuring proceedings may involve intense negotiations between the debtor and 
the creditors. During the negotiation stage, the draft plan may be significantly 
modified. There is no limit on the number of modifications and amendments that can 
                                                 
98  Wood Bankruptcy 421. 
99  Wood Bankruptcy 421 and 422. 
100  CCAA S 6(3); BIA S 60(1.1). 
101  CCAA S 6(5); BIA S 60(1.3). 
102  CCAA S 6(6); BIA S 60(1.5). 
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be made during this stage.103 Once the plan has been sufficiently developed, a 
meeting of creditors is called so they can vote on the plan.104 The CCAA provides 
that a court may order a meeting of the creditors but provides very little guidance on 
the process. The detail is supplied by the court in a meeting and approval order that 
establishes the procedure for the calling and holding of a meeting of the creditors to 
vote on the plan.105 The CCAA provides that the court may adjourn a meeting of 
creditors if an alteration or modification of the plan has been proposed after the court 
has ordered a meeting.106 
 
The BIA contains a set of rules that directs the calling of a meeting of creditors. The 
trustee must call the meeting within twenty-one days of the filing of the proposal with 
the official receiver107 and the rules governing meeting of creditors under the BIA are 
applicable.108 The chair may adjourn the meeting to permit further investigation or 
examination.  
 
Unaffected creditors 
 
Both statutes provide that the plan must be approved by a majority of creditors 
representing two-thirds of the value of the claims.109 A plan does not need to address 
all of the creditors and those that are left unaffected have no right to vote on it.110 
Unaffected creditors enjoy their full legal rights once the restructuring has been 
completed and stay of proceedings has been lifted.111 The CCAA does not contain 
any restriction as to the kinds of parties that may be designated as unaffected under 
a plan. Under the BIA, a proposal must be made to all unsecured creditors, thus it is 
not possible to leave a class of unsecured creditors outside a proposal.112 The BIA 
provides that a proposal "may" be made to secured creditors.113 
 
                                                 
103  Wood Bankruptcy 423. 
104 Wood Bankruptcy 423. 
105  Wood Bankruptcy 425. 
106  CCAA S 7. 
107  BIA S 51(1). 
108  Wood Bankruptcy C-8 A(1). 
109  CCAA S 6(1); BIA S 3, 54(2) and 62(2)(b). 
110  Wood Bankruptcy 427. 
111  Wood Bankruptcy 427. 
112  Wood Bankruptcy 427. 
113  BIA S 50(1.3). 
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The CCAA is silent on the question of partial acceptance. In Olympia & York 
Developments Ltd v Royal Trust Co,114 the plan specifically provided that if a class of 
creditors voted against the plan that class would drop out of the plan. Therefore, the 
class of creditors that voted for the plan were bound and those that voted against it 
were unaffected by it. However, this becomes more difficult where the plan is silent 
on this matter and the court must determine the intention of the parties.115 
 
All classes of unsecured creditors must approve the proposal under the BIA.116 A 
vote against the proposal by any class of unsecured creditors will cause the plan to 
fail and the court will be unable to approve the proposal.117 The BIA provides that the 
proposal is only binding on secured creditors if they approve the plan by dual 
majority.  
 
Under both CCAA and BIA, if a creditor is related to the debtor, the creditor may vote 
against the plan but not for the acceptance of it.118 This is because the non-related 
parties may be concerned that the related party will vote in favour of the plan for 
approval, whereas the exclusion of their votes would result in a rejection of the 
plan.119 
 
Classification of creditors 
 
The CCAA and the BIA provide for the creation of classes of creditors for the 
purposes of voting on the plan, which includes the classification of both secured and 
unsecured creditors.120 These statutory rules are largely codifications of the judicially 
created principles and therefore it becomes necessary to review the case law to fully 
understand the rational and logic behind them.121 Sovereign Life assurance Co v 
Dodd122 states that the rational for placing creditors into different classes is that "the 
creditors composing the different classes have different interests; and, therefore, if 
                                                 
114  1993, 17 CBR (3d) 1 (Ont Ct Gen Div) – hereafter Olympia & York. 
115  Wood Bankruptcy 428. 
116  BIA S 54(2)(d). 
117  Wood Bankruptcy 428. 
118  CCAA S 22(3); BIA S 54(3). 
119  Wood Bankruptcy 429. 
120  CCAA S 22. 
121  Wood Bankruptcy 434. 
122  [1892] 2 QB 573 (CA) 580 per Lord Escher – hereafter Sovereign. 
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we find a different state of facts existing among different creditors which may 
differently affect their minds and their judgment, they must be divided into different 
classes." The following test has been utilised to determine whether a classification 
scheme is fair and reasonable: 
 
It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term "class" as will 
prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, 
and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so 
dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to 
their common interest.123 
 
Whereas the classification scheme under the CCAA applies to both secured and 
unsecured creditors, the scheme under the BIA addresses secured creditors only.124 
The statutory provisions allow the classification of creditors if their interests are 
sufficiently similar to give them a commonality of interest, taking into account the 
following factors: the nature of the debts giving rise to the claims, the nature and 
rank of any security in respect of the claim, the remedies available to the creditors in 
the absence of the plan and the extent to which the creditors would recover their 
claims by exercising those remedies, the treatment of the claims under the plan and 
the extent to which the claims would be paid under the plan, and such further criteria 
consistent with the foregoing.125 The statutory formulation also provides that a 
relevant consideration is the nature of the debts giving rise to the claims.126 
 
Objecting to the classification scheme 
 
A claimant who is dissatisfied with the fairness of the plan may seek an order calling 
for the use of a different scheme. The CCAA provides that the debtor must apply to 
the court for approval of a classification scheme for voting at a meeting.127 The BIA 
provides that a court, on application made at any time after a notice of intention or 
proposal is filed, may determine the classes of secured claims appropriate to a 
proposal.128 Although there is no similar provision in respect of unsecured creditors 
                                                 
123  Sovereign 583, Lord Bowen. 
124  CCAA S22(2); BIA S 50(1.4). 
125  Wood Bankruptcy 442. 
126  Wood Bankruptcy 442. 
127  CCAA S 22(1). 
128  BIA S 50(1.5). 
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that object to the classification scheme in a proposal, a court may permit a similar 
procedure to be followed.129 
 
The treatment of shareholder claims 
 
The restructuring regimes only deal with voting on a plan by creditors, and do not 
make any provisions with respect to shareholders. The CCAA provides that the 
provisions of any federal or provincial legislation that authorises or makes provisions 
for the sanction of compromises or arrangements between a company and its 
shareholders may be applied in conjunction with the Act.130 The BIA does not contain 
a similar provision. Under both regimes, a court may order that the constating 
instrument be amended to reflect any changes that may be lawfully made under 
federal or provincial law.131 The question that arises in any restructuring proceeding 
is whether shareholder approval is needed to implement the restructuring plan (that 
is, approval for specific transactions, amalgamation, fundamental changes, and so 
forth). The shareholders will generally be able to receive some consideration or 
maintain some participation in the restructured corporation as the price for obtaining 
their consent to the transaction if their approval is needed.132 Shareholders may 
legitimately expect to participate in the restructuring if there is a reasonable 
possibility that their interests retain some value.133 
 
Approval by the court 
 
The court must approve the plan before it becomes binding on the creditors. The 
court will consider the report of the trustee or the monitor before approving or 
rejecting the plan.134 The court may not approve a plan if the creditors have rejected 
it. A plan's fairness and reasonableness are critical under both restructuring 
regimes.135 
 
                                                 
129  Wood Bankruptcy 442. 
130  CCAA S 42. 
131  CCAA S 6(2); BIA S 59(4). 
132  Wood Bankruptcy 443. 
133  Wood Bankruptcy 444. 
134  CCAA S23 (1)(i).  
135  Wood Bankruptcy 446. 
 JGA KRÜGER                    PER / PELJ  2010(13)3 
 
24/508 
 
The CCAA provides that a court may sanction a plan that has been approved by the 
creditors, but it does not provide any criteria to assist a court in making that decision. 
The relevant considerations that have been developed in a series of decisions are 
that there must be strict compliance with the statutory criteria, there must be no 
unauthorised conduct, and the plan must be fair and reasonable.136 
 
A different set of criteria are to be applied by a court in deciding whether to approve 
a proposal under the BIA. A court is directed to refuse a proposal if the terms of the 
proposal are unreasonable or the terms of the proposal are not calculated to benefit 
the general body of creditors.137 
 
Generally, in deciding whether to approve or refuse a plan, the courts consider 
procedural fairness, amount of recovery in comparison to liquidation, changes in 
priority ranking, composition of the vote, and the likelihood of elimination of financial 
crisis under the plan.138 
 
The legal effect of approval or rejection 
 
A plan binds every creditor in each class of creditors that voted in favour of it when a 
plan has been approved by the creditors and by a court. It does not bind unaffected 
creditors or classes of creditors that voted against the plan. Upon court approval, the 
obligations owed by the debtor to affected creditors are discharged and replaced 
with the obligations that are provided for in the plan.139  
 
A refusal of a proposal by the unsecured creditors results in an automatic bankruptcy 
of the debtor under the BIA.140 Therefore, each class of unsecured creditors must 
approve the proposal. The rejection of proposal by one or more classes of secured 
creditors does not have the same effect and the dissenting classes will be treated as 
unaffected creditors.141 
                                                 
136  Northland Properties Ltd v Excelsior Life Ins Co of Can 1989, 73 CBR (NS) 195 (BCCA); 
Olympia & York. 
137  BIA S 59(2). 
138  Wood Bankruptcy 447–450. 
139  Wood Bankruptcy 450. 
140  BIA S 57. 
141  BIA S 62(2). 
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The CCAA does not provide for an automatic bankruptcy or for the automatic 
termination of the stay of proceedings upon refusal of the plan by the creditors. 
Creditors need to bring an application before the court to terminate the stay of 
proceedings or wait until the designated period for the stay of proceedings 
expires.142 They may apply for a bankruptcy order or otherwise enforce their claims 
against the debtor. 
 
Post-approval default 
 
The treatment of post-approval default under the CCAA is relatively 
straightforward.143 A default under new obligations will give the creditors the normal 
enforcement remedies associated with those rights. The debtor may attempt to 
initiate a second round of restructuring proceedings if the financial crisis is not 
improved.  
 
The situation under BIA is more complex. Proposals that are made with respect to 
smaller corporations are more likely to involve terms that require future performance, 
such as putting a lease into good standing or making certain future payments in 
keeping with the proposal. The BIA provides a system for judicial annulment of a 
proposal, which is significant, since it will result in the automatic bankruptcy of the 
debtor.144 A court may annul a proposal if there has been a default under the terms 
of a proposal, if the court is of the opinion that the continuation of proposal results in 
injustice,145 if the approval of the court was obtained by fraud, or if the debtor has 
been convicted of bankruptcy offence.146 The power to annul a proposal is 
discretionary and therefore the court is not required to order an annulment on a 
default in performance.147 An annulment of a proposal does not affect the validity of 
any sale, disposition of property, or payment duly made or done under or in 
pursuance of the proposal.148 
                                                 
142  Wood Bankruptcy 451. 
143  Wood Bankruptcy 451. 
144  BIA S 63(4). 
145  Garritty 2006, 21 CBR (5th) 237 (Alta QB). 
146  BIA S 63(1) and (3). 
147  Wood Bankruptcy 452. 
148  BIA S 63(2). 
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Conclusion 
 
From personal experience, I can assure you that in Canada the legislation for the 
restructuring of insolvent corporations works very well. It serves to save thousands of 
jobs every year, and has resulted in countless insolvent corporations being 
resurrected and restored to excellent financial health. Effective restructuring 
legislation in South Africa is to be encouraged. 
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